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The economic and fi nancial crisis, policy responses and their impact on public 
fi nances. A global perspective.
The authors of this article are Enrique Alberola and Fernando Gutiérrez del Arroyo, of the Associate Directorate General 
International Affairs.1
The worsening of the economic and fi nancial situation since summer 2007 and, especially, its 
drastic intensifi cation from September last year are having far-reaching consequences on the 
public fi nances of the main developed economies and, to a lesser degree, on those of devel-
oping countries.
The deterioration of public fi nances refl ects the strong economic policy response through fi s-
cal stimulus plans and measures to support the fi nancial system, though it also increasingly 
mirrors the severe decline in economic and fi nancial activity. The economic policy response 
has involved not only the tax authorities but also central banks and other public entities – such 
as deposit guarantee funds and public and semi-public fi nancial institutions. Chart 1 provides 
a simplifi ed representation of the quickening and growing involvement of US authorities by 
quantifying the support provided by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to the fi nancial sys-
tem as well as the fi scal stimulus measures. Between summer 2007 and March 2008, the ef-
fects of the fi nancial turmoil on activity were still relatively moderate and their scope was lim-
ited to the United States and a growing number of developed economies. In that period, 
fi nancial support was based, essentially, on increasing the liquidity provided by central banks 
and on occasional bail-outs of specifi c entities. Furthermore, an initial fi scal stimulus package 
was implemented in the United States in February 2008. From March 2008 (with the Bear 
Stearns bail-out), the deepening of the fi nancial problems led to a stepping-up of support 
which remained centred on providing liquidity. In mid-September, however, there was a quan-
titative and qualitative leap in the economic policy response in all advanced economies and, to 
a lesser extent and slightly later, in emerging economies. On the one hand, the spectrum of 
fi nancial support measures was extended signifi cantly (to include, in addition to practically 
unlimited liquidity, direct fi nancing of fi nancial institutions and other sectors, capital injections, 
asset purchases and guarantees for bank assets and liabilities); and on the other, fi scal stimu-
lus plans were introduced in an increasing number of countries. The amounts committed in the 
fi nancial and economic sphere have multiplied since last summer. For example, in the United 
States – excluding guarantees – they have increased sixfold and already account for half of its 
gross domestic product (see Chart 1).
All these measures are resulting in a sharp increase in government defi cits and in public debt 
ratios and a strong deterioration in the long-term fi scal outlook. However, it is diffi cult a priori 
to assess the fi scal cost of the crisis. First, a substantial amount of committed government fi -
nancial support has not yet been used or does not represent an actual upfront outlay (as in the 
case of guarantees) or, even if it does, it may be partially recovered a posteriori (as in the case 
of asset purchases or lending). Second, a large share of government support, undertaken by 
central banks or other fi nancially independent bodies, falls, in principle, outside the scope of 
the budget; however, a portion of these amounts could ultimately have a potentially large 
budgetary impact. Third, the crisis is still ongoing, which makes it diffi cult not only to evaluate 
its fi scal impact but even to make an up-to-date calculation of the amounts invested.
Introduction
1. This article has benefi ted from the collaboration of other members of the Directorates General International Affairs, 
Economics, Statistics and Research, and Operations, and, in particular, of Lucía Cuadro and Ana del Río, in order to 
make the data from various sources uniform and consistent.
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In this context, the purpose of this article is to assess from a quantitative, qualitative and com-
parative standpoint the channels through which the fi nancial and economic crisis and the 
economic policy response to it are affecting public fi nances, adopting a global and, insofar as 
is possible, homogenous perspective, covering both advanced and emerging economies. To 
this end, it is necessary to establish a framework of analysis which makes it possible to dif-
ferentiate, on the one hand, between the impact related to the fi nancial crisis and that linked 
to the economic recession; and, on the other, between the direct impact of the crisis con-
nected with the adjustment of economic and fi nancial activity, and that arising from economic 
policy measures. In this framework, fi rst, the fi nancial sector support measures adopted by 
various economic authorities will be analysed in some detail, drawing a distinction between the 
various consequences that they may have on public fi nances at different time horizons. Sec-
ond, the fi scal stimulus plans and the direct impact of the crisis on government revenue and 
expenditure, fi scal balances and government debt will be studied. Similarly, the medium-term 
impact on public fi nances and, especially, on the expected debt dynamic is examined. From 
the whole analysis, it is concluded that public fi nances will be in a delicate situation over the 
next few years. This deterioration poses notable challenges for economic authorities, includ-
ing, inter alia, those of taking steps so that the fragile situation in itself does not limit the ef-
fectiveness of the measures adopted and reaffi rming the long-term commitment to fi scal dis-
cipline.
Two different strands underpin the conceptual framework for analysing the effect of the crisis 
on public fi nances. The fi rst refers to scope, either fi nancial or more strictly economic; the 
second makes it possible to distinguish between the direct impact, arising from developments 
in economic and fi nancial activity, and the indirect impact, resulting from the reaction of eco-
nomic policies, i.e. the discretionary support measures for the fi nancial system and the fi scal 
stimulus plans. The implications for public fi nances differ depending on the authority imple-
menting the measures: ministries of economic affairs and fi nance, central banks or other pub-
lic or semi-public entities such as deposit guarantee funds or public fi nancial institutions.
On the basis of these two strands, Table 1 summarises the various channels and their potential 
effect on the defi cit and public debt, differentiating in the case of the latter between the short-
term impact and the potential medium- and long-term impact. The direct impact of the real 
Framework of the analysis
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contraction accompanying the crisis – the fi rst row of the table – represents the loss of revenue 
– direct and indirect tax receipts – and increased expenditure through automatic stabilisers. 
Another direct and negative effect on public fi nances stems from the sharp adjustment of the 
fi nancial sector – included in the last row of Table 1 – which may represent a sizeable reduction 
of tax revenue and, therefore, an increase in the defi cit and debt. It is estimated that this loss 
would mainly be triggered by the decrease in fi nancial institutions’ profi ts and dividends, and 
lower receipts arising from adjustments in the value of fi nancial and real estate assets (fi nancial 
losses).
As for the impact of economic policy measures, a distinction should be drawn between fi scal 
measures to support demand or productive activity – the second block in the table – and the 
fi nancial sector support measures, the following block. There are certain measures which fall 
within a grey area (in particular, fi nancing for productive sectors), which in many cases are 
channelled through the fi nancial system and, although they often tend to be announced as 
part of fi scal stimulus packages, should be considered as fi nancial support measures.
The purely fi scal measures are confi ned to those affecting government spending and revenue, 
such as investment, tax cuts and fi scal incentives for households and fi rms. All these meas-
ures entail, in principle, a reduction in the fi scal balance resulting in higher debt in the short 
term. The fi nancial support measures are more varied and increasingly diverse as new support 
strategies are created. In this article they have been grouped into four categories, based on 
their immediate or actual impact on public fi nances which, in turn, depends on the institution 
implementing the measure. Table 2 links the type of measure to the institution which imple-
ments it:
1) Capital injections for banks and other fi nancial institutions through preference, 
ordinary or other shares, such as subordinated debt, undertaken in general by 
the Treasury. These are included in individual bail-outs and general plans.
CURRENT FUTURE (b)
FINANCIAL
SPHERE
Capital injections
Asset purchases and 
financing by Treasury
Central bank financial support
— Of which: with
Treasury backing
seetnarauG
Financial
crisis
Profits, dividends and revenue
ECONOMIC
SPHERE
DEBTBUDGET
DEFICIT
Financial
support
Fiscal stimulus packages
Automatic stabilisers
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS (a) TABLE 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. = Unfavourable impact; + = Actual or possible favourable impact; ? = Depends on 
implementation and accounting criteria.
b. Indicates a future contingent (new or additional) impact on debt. A plus sign indicates a (partial or
total) reversion of the future impact with respect to the immediate one.
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+
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2) Asset purchases and fi nancing by the Treasury. Asset purchases cover bonds 
and other fi nancial instruments – which are illiquid and, in certain cases, troubled 
– and include transactions with a repurchase option. Treasury fi nancing is tar-
geted at the fi nancial sector and other ailing productive sectors (automobiles, 
housing, exports, etc.).
3) Central bank fi nancial support. This category includes, fi rst, the provision of 
liquidity (including the facilities or windows created or extended after the tur-
moil began). As more and more measures were rolled out and the maturities 
of the operations and the collateral were extended, the boundary between the 
provision of liquidity and fi nancing – which in current circumstances is some-
what arbitrary – has become blurred, especially insofar as certain central 
banks have acted with the explicit objective of restoring the fl ow of credit on 
various markets. Similarly, a growing number of central banks have embarked 
on operations to purchase assets and on providing guarantees. In certain 
countries, a portion of these measures was backed with Treasury fi nancing – 
which we shall consider as a sub-category – although the recent trend is to-
wards central banks and other agencies increasingly taking responsibility for 
implementing fi nancial measures, to the detriment of the Treasuries, due large-
ly to the fact that the fi nancial position of the latter is increasingly compro-
mised.
4) Guarantees which back fi nancial institutions’ liabilities and, more recently, their 
assets. The liabilities guaranteed mainly comprise new debt, in order to make it 
easier to issue and to cut its cost in a period in which it is diffi cult to tap the mar-
kets. Although guarantees for bank deposits are widespread, they have not been 
included because it is diffi cult to calculate and compare them across countries.2 
Guaranteeing assets is a trend which began in 2009 and affects the troubled as-
sets of ailing entities. In fact, it is worth underlining the interplay between the 
guarantee system and other types of support, such as asset purchases or capital 
injections.
The fi nancial impact of these measures is included in the third block of Table 1. In general, they 
do not necessarily have an immediate impact on fi scal balances, although a broad range of 
situations may arise, and there are exceptions depending on each country’s accounting crite-
Capital
injections
Asset
purchases
Financing Liquidity Guarantees
X)a(XXXyrusaerT
XX)a(XXknablartneC
XXXsnoitutitsnicilbuprehtO
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Treasury financing for central bank measures is attributed to the latter but is broken down separately 
in Chart 2.
INSTITUTIONS PROVIDING FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND MEASURES IMPLEMENTED TABLE 2
2. In the European Union guarantees are provided for deposits of up to €100,000, but in certain countries this fi gure is 
higher and in others there is no limit.
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ria.3 Capital injections and debt guarantees can even generate revenue in the short term – as 
shown by the plus sign – arising from the dividends committed, in the case of the capital injec-
tions or the fees required to gain access to the guarantees. Capital injections, asset purchases 
and Treasury fi nancing involve upfront loading as the funds committed are used and, therefore, 
result in an increase in government debt in the short term. Lastly, central bank fi nancial support 
and guarantees do not involve a parallel increase in government debt, although there are ex-
ceptions such as the provisions for guarantees set up in some countries or the above-men-
tioned Treasury backing of central banks.
Short-term effects on debt may differ from the long-term effects. In the case of asset pur-
chases and capital injections, the outcome will depend on how the value of the asset and of 
the capital performs (in addition to the cumulative fl ow of returns). In particular, it cannot be 
ruled out that part of the outlay may be recovered (as indicated by the plus sign in the last 
column of Table 2) once the fi nancial stress has been overcome, partly reversing the previous 
increase in debt, so that the outcome (when the positions are unwound) is less negative for 
public fi nances than its initial impact. The opposite might also occur, posing an additional 
burden. In the case of guarantees, the cost would only be incurred if the guarantees had to be 
called. As for central bank support measures and Treasury fi nancing, these institutions would 
incur a fi nancial loss if the lending were not repaid or, in the case of facilities with collateral, if 
the value of the collateral were lower than the amount of the loan.
In short, in the case of fi nancial support measures there are three important aspects for as-
sessing their impact on public fi nances: the initial outlay, the proportion recovered ex post and 
the possible contingent losses of other types of measures which do not involve an initial out-
lay.
Using this framework it is possible to describe the fi scal and fi nancial support measures, ex-
amine how they are recorded and make cross-country and cross-regional comparisons. This 
exercise is subject to numerous caveats, since it is diffi cult to address and compare on a con-
sistent basis the broad spectrum of measures with varying characteristics and particular fea-
tures inherent to each country. There are three important considerations when assessing this 
exercise:
i) Certain important measures to stabilise the system, such as the above-men-
tioned deposit guarantees, are not included in the calculation. Nor does it con-
sider monetary and exchange rate policy measures (interest rate reductions, the 
use of reserves or recent purchases of government assets by certain central 
banks),4 which, to a certain extent, have also served to bolster the fi nancial sec-
tor, nor other types of measures which have been important for maintaining inter-
national fi nancing fl ows, such as currency swaps and the external support pack-
ages of multilateral and regional fi nancial bodies.
ii) The fi gures presented are obtained by adding together measures of a very varied 
nature and with different fi scal implications, as described above. Therefore, their 
extrapolation to fi scal aggregates and the cross-country comparison must be 
undertaken with the utmost caution.
3. In the United States and the United Kingdom a large amount of the fi nancial support is included in the defi cit. 4. Pub-
lic asset purchases have been announced as part of some countries’ fi nancial support plans. However, insofar are they 
are aimed at affecting long-term interest rates, they fi t better in the monetary policy sphere. Also, in terms of accounting, 
their consolidated net effect on the public sector is nil. For these reasons, unlike the IMF’s analysis, they are excluded 
from our calculations unless otherwise indicated.
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iii) The amount committed is adopted as the criterion for recording the measures, 
which generally represents an intermediate point between the actual outlay 
and that announced. This generates certain diffi culties, due to the lack of pre-
cise data or the reformulation of certain measures (as occurred with TARP, the 
fi rst US fi nancial programme), the classifi cation diffi culties in other cases (the 
above-mentioned distinction between liquidity and fi nancing) and, in general, 
comparability problems arising from the different strategies for responding to 
the crisis.
The time span of the analysis is from the beginning of 2008 (which includes practically all the 
measures adopted) until April 2009. The main reference document is the recent IMF paper 
(2009), which is supplemented by contributions from the OECD (2009), the ECLAC (2009) and 
the European Commission (2009). The aim is to achieve the greatest possible consistency 
across countries and regions, based on up-to-date information. The sample covers the princi-
pal developed and emerging economies in the G20+ (which includes Spain), which represent 
approximately 75% of world GDP. The G20+ group of advanced economies will be considered 
and, unless stated otherwise, the four main emerging economies (the BRICs: Brazil, Russia, 
India and China), to represent the emerging countries. For each country the fi gures are in rela-
tion to the GDP in 2008 and, if successive years are analysed, to the GDP of each year; the 
data updating limit is mid-May.
The upper panel of Chart 2 refl ects the amount committed in the fi nancial system support 
measures, according to the categorisation described in the previous section, for the principal 
countries and areas analysed. The funds committed amount, in aggregate, to almost one-third 
of their GDP (a fi gure equivalent to the GDP of the United States in the G20). The largest por-
tions relate to guarantees for bank assets and liabilities (46% of the total, 15% of the GDP of 
the G20+) and to central bank fi nancial support (two-fi fths of the total, i.e. 13% of GDP), a 
small part of which is fi nanced in turn by the Treasury. Accounting for a smaller fraction are 
asset purchases and direct Treasury fi nancing, on the one hand, and capital injections, on the 
other: 7.4% and 6.9% of the total, equivalent to 2.5% and 2.3% of the GDP of the G20+, re-
spectively.
Although all the countries analysed have adopted measures of some type, there are pro-
nounced differences between regions and countries. The most striking difference is that ob-
served between the developed and the emerging economies. Thus, committed fi nancial sup-
port amounts to 50% of GDP in the advanced economies, where guarantees play a relatively 
larger role, but it only represents around 5% of GDP in the BRICs, where central bank support 
is dominant.
There are important differences in the scale of fi nancial support in the advanced economies. 
The United States and the United Kingdom stand out from the rest because of the amount 
committed – 83% and 82% of their respective GDP – and because they are the countries 
which have taken the initiative and set the pace in this sphere.
In the United States approximately half of the amount of the measures adopted relates to the 
fi nancial backing of the Federal Reserve, which has acted on numerous and diverse fronts (see 
the bottom panel of Chart 2). Only a small portion of the Fed’s support (slightly more than 14%) 
stems from its more traditional activity (providing liquidity) since it is considered that the facilities 
which have been set up since last September constitute credit facilities. These facilities, in ex-
change for collateral, in particular, have been designed to prop up various segments: the com-
mercial paper market (CPFF), the money markets (MMIFF) and other securitisation markets 
Financial support 
measures
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paralysed by the crisis, through the term asset-backed securities loan facility (TALF).5 The 
credit facilities made available amount to 24% of GDP and represent more than half of the 
Fed’s total support. The Federal Reserve has also embarked on purchases of mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) to prop up this market, for a maximum amount of nearly 10% of GDP, 
and has furnished guarantees for some banks’ assets, amounting to 2.1% of GDP. Lastly, there 
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5. Only liquidity facilities arranged between summer 2007 and September 2008 are included. In order to distinguish be-
tween liquidity and fi nancing the timing criterion is used, because since October the authorities’ explicit concern was to 
restore the funding of troubled markets and this was the context in which new facilities were designed. Thus, the CPFF 
was aimed at unclogging the commercial paper market, which is essential for short-term lending in the United States, 
and the MMIFF was set up to overcome problems on the money markets stemming from very low interest rates. The 
TALF is more general and, although it has not been used much to date, is an important element in the strategy of market 
normalisation. The amount of these funding facilities is very high: $1,800 bn (CPFF), $900 bn (TALF) and $540 bn 
(MMIFF), which is nearly 20% of US GDP. However, until the beginning of May, only a small portion had been used: 
$245 bn. The Fed has also provided funding to support and bail out specifi c entities, such as the investment bank Bear 
Stearns ($23 bn) and the insurance company AIG ($90 bn). 
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are two measures adopted by the Federal Reserve which, as mentioned above, are not in-
cluded in our calculation: the purchase of Treasury bonds ($300 bn committed, 2.1% of GDP) 
and currency swap lines with a number of countries, $250 bn of which had been utilised.
The remaining US fi nancial support is made up of action by the Treasury and guarantees. Di-
rect action by the Treasury has centred on injecting capital into numerous banks through the 
TARP (approved amount: $700 bn), into the insurance company AIG and into the government-
sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which account for half of the capital in-
jections. The plan to purchase troubled assets also includes a contribution of up to $100 bn of 
public capital. Overall, the total amount committed for capital injections is more than $800 bn 
(5.6% of GDP). Asset purchases by the Treasury, which constituted the initial strategy for ac-
tion after September (the TARP was going to be used for this purpose), have so far been re-
stricted to the acquisition of MBS ($50 bn, less than half a percentage point of GDP). Lastly, 
the funding provided has also been marginal ($30 bn for automobile companies), although, it 
is necessary to consider, as mentioned above, the support fi nancing to the Fed. Finally, the 
guarantees – excluding those backed by the Fed – represent 43% of the total amount com-
mitted (36 pp of GDP). Noteworthy among the guarantees is that for new bank debt, amount-
ing to $1,450 bn (10% of GDP), backed by the US Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC); 
the temporary guarantee for money market funds created by the Treasury ($3,000 bn), and the 
new private-public investment programme for purchase of troubled assets and loans which 
will be implemented over the coming months and will also be guaranteed (by the FDIC) for an 
undetermined amount which may exceed $500 bn.6
Although the range of fi nancial support measures adopted in the United Kingdom is similar to 
that of the United States, the breakdown is different, with guarantees clearly predominating 
(more than 60% of the total, 50% of GDP). These guarantees are subdivided into those for 
new debts and securitised assets and those for the assets of fi nancial institutions through the 
Asset Protection Scheme (APS). The Bank of England’s participation is channelled through 
one main facility (the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS)), fi nanced by the Treasury, as seen in 
Chart 2, and through purchases of up to £50 bn of fi nancial assets in the form of commercial 
paper and other private assets.7 In addition, capital injections have been made into banks (4% 
of GDP) and some have been bailed out, involving substantial fi nancing (10% of GDP).
In other advanced economies, less support has been provided, although it has gradually been 
increased. In Japan it now exceeds 20% of GDP and is provided mainly through government 
agencies authorised to purchase assets, particularly commercial paper and shares. Support in 
euro area countries amounts to nearly 30% of euro area GDP. Here guarantees are the pre-
dominant type of measure, representing around two-thirds of the total. Support from the cen-
tral bank8 consists of long-term liquidity operations [and will include the recently approved 
purchase of €60 billion of covered bonds (0.7% of GDP)]. There are notable differences in fi -
nancial support between the countries of the euro area. The Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, 
small economies where bank capital injections have been relatively large, are considerably 
6. The plan to buy troubled assets and loans (legacy assets and loans) was announced in March and consists of a joint 
initiative between the public and private sector (hence the Private Public Investment Program) to help clean up banks’ 
balance sheets. This programme combines several of the categories considered: FDIC guarantees, Treasury fi nancing 
and even indirect Federal Reserve support through the use of loans acquired as collateral under the TALF. 7. Asset 
purchases by the Bank of England (Asset Purchase Facility) are for up to 150 billion pounds sterling, although they in-
clude the acquisition of up to 100 billion pounds sterling (7% of GDP) of government bonds which have not been in-
cluded in our calculations for the reasons given in footnote 5. 8. Unlike the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England, the 
ECB has not set up new facilities, but has made the existing ones more fl exible. For this reason, the increase in the ECB 
balance sheet is included under this heading. Moreover, in the euro area countries analysed in Chart 2, the category 
“Support from the central bank” is not included because it is centralised in the ECB.
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above the average, as is Ireland, which, moreover, opted to guarantee in full its bank assets, 
the committed support being more than twice its GDP. The support committed in France and 
Germany is around 20% of GDP. The fi nancial support committed in Spain is about 13% of 
GDP (€150 billion); moreover, Spain is one of the few countries among the advanced econo-
mies that has not carried out capital injections.
The emerging economies have devoted ten times fewer resources than the advanced econo-
mies, in terms of their respective GDP, to supporting the fi nancial sector. This notable contrast 
with the advanced countries may be attributed partly to the differing nature, intensity and 
transmission channels of the fi nancial crisis in the two areas, which has required different re-
sponses. Having said that, it should be noted that the capacity of these economies to respond 
to the crisis is, with some exceptions, more limited in an environment of diffi cult access to in-
ternational fi nancing.
Specifi cally, the main response in the emerging economies has been to supply foreign cur-
rency fi nancing to the fi nancial system and to the corporate sector and, in many cases, to re-
duce exchange rate volatility through the use of international reserves, particularly in 2008 Q4. 
Against this background, the support of other central banks – particularly the Federal Reserve, 
but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the central banks of Switzerland 
and China, under foreign currency swap agreements – has been a key factor in mitigating the 
uncertainty in numerous countries, making for smoother provision of foreign currencies to 
domestic fi nancial agents and companies. These agreements, which have been utilised only 
partially, are set out in Chart 3, which also includes those of the Federal Reserve with other 
developed economies and, in the last column, reciprocal agreements of the main central banks 
with the United States.9
Lastly, a growing number of emerging economies have turned to international fi nancial or-
ganisations for fi nancing and guarantees. In the case of the new EU member countries, sup-
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9. The ECB, apart from the swaps with members of the ERM II and with other developed countries, has offered repo-type 
loans to other EU members, such as Hungary and Poland. Notably the Federal Reserve itself also has a swap facility with 
major economies (blue bars), refl ecting the distortions persisting in the foreign exchange markets.
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port has been offered jointly by the international fi nancial organisations, the EU itself and some 
European development banks. Table 3 shows that the support packages – through traditional 
stand-by or preventive agreements, through new facilities (such as the fl exible credit line (FCL)) 
– have multiplied in the last six months. In this period the agreements approved have totalled 
more than $150 billion and the outstanding loans have returned to the levels of early 2006. The 
increase in fi nancing to the IMF, approved at the April G20 summit, for an amount of $500 bil-
lion, thus represents a key source of fi nancial support to the emerging economies, which are 
less able to mobilise domestic funds.
As regards the expected fi scal impact of all these fi nancial support measures, it should fi rst be 
pointed out that the calculations mentioned above do not refl ect the impact of fi nancial sup-
port on public fi nances in either the short or the long term. The high fi gures for support com-
mitments (expressed as a percentage of GDP) should be qualifi ed, since to a large extent no 
fi nancial cost is involved, for three main reasons:
— First, the support committed has only been partially utilised. Moreover, this proc-
ess is gradual and, in some cases, such as the guarantees, it is very likely that the 
maximum limit will not be reached. The level of utilisation also varies widely across 
the different categories, tending to be higher in capital injections and asset pur-
chases than in guarantees. For the United States, it is estimated that around 30% 
of the total commitments have been used; however, in the United Kingdom the 
level of utilisation amply exceeds 60%, while in the euro area the level of utilisation 
is around 25%. In Spain, the percentage utilised was about 40% in mid-May.
— The second reason derives from the distinction between the amount committed 
and the amounts to be disbursed (upfront loading), and therefore having a budg-
etary impact, when the facilities are utilised. The relationship between these two 
variables is shown in Chart 4. As mentioned when the analysis framework was 
Agreements
approved
Type
(a)
Amount
($m)
Amount
(% of GDP)
Date of
approval
Ukraine SBA 16,500 11.65 5.11.2008
Hungary SBA 15,700 11.35 6.11.2008
Iceland SBA 2,100 10.38 19.11.2008
Pakistan SBA 7,600 5.29 24.11.2008
Latvia SBA 2,350 8.65 23.12.2008
Belarus SBA 2,500 5.58 12.1.2009
Serbia SBA 3,968 9.96 16.1.2009
El Salvador SBA (P) 791 3.88 16.1.2009
Mongolia SBA 225 5.79 1.4.2009
Costa Rica SBA (P) 724 2.76 10.4.2009
Mexico FCL (P) 48,505 4.74 17.4.2009
Guatemala SBA P(P) 951 2.82 22.4.2009
Romania SBA 17,100 10.00 4.5.2009
Colombia FCL (P) 10,397 5.00 11.5.2009
Poland FCL (P) 21,062 4.99 Pending
375,051LATOT
SOURCE: IMF.
a. SBA = Stand-by agreement; FCL = Flexible credit line; (P) = Preventive agreement.
IMF FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND PROGRAMS SINCE SEPTEMBER 2008 TABLE 3
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explained, generally only capital injections, loans and asset purchases by the 
Treasury, which are a small part of the total support, involve an immediate effective 
cost with a budgetary impact. It is possible that some of the other measures may 
have an immediate cost (depending on how they are carried out and on their ac-
counting treatment), but, in any event, according to these criteria and taking cer-
tain specifi c adjustments into account, it may be estimated that for the G20+ as 
a whole only 12% of the amounts committed involve actual ex ante outlay, i.e. 
nearly 4% of the GDP of the G20. The proportion is similar in the advanced econ-
omies, although for these it represents around 6% of GDP: among the latter, in the 
United States it amounts to 7.5% of GDP (although it is only 9% of the total com-
mitment) and in the United Kingdom to 20% of GDP.10 In Spain it is estimated that 
this fi gure will exceed 4% of GDP (slightly above one-third of the total, due to the 
relative importance of asset purchases), somewhat more than in the euro area as 
a whole. By contrast, the proportion in the BRICs is even lower (6%) and, there-
fore, the amounts to be disbursed are very small, around 0.3% of GDP.
— Finally, some of the amounts invested will foreseeably be recovered. It should not 
be overlooked that most of the measures have been taken to stabilise the fi nancial 
system and smooth the way to normalisation and subsequent recovery. In this 
respect, all measures are intended to be temporary and it is assumed that a sub-
stantial portion of the amounts committed and disbursed will eventually be recov-
ered. It is, however, very diffi cult to determine in advance the amount that will be 
recovered, given the depth of the crisis, its early stage of development and the 
uncertainty as to its duration and fi nal impact. In any event, the empirical evidence 
[see Laeven and Valencia (2008)] shows that the fi scal costs of fi nancial crises can 
be very high, depending on the circumstances, although there are also cases, 
such as that of Sweden, in which the amount of bank bailouts exceeded 4% of 
GDP and the fi nal cost was very small, while in some developed economies, such 
as Japan, they exceeded 13% of GDP and the rate of recovery was very low 
[Laeven and Valencia (2008)].
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SOURCES: IMF (2009b) and Banco de España.
10. In the United Kingdom the percentage of upfront loading is higher than elsewhere (one-quarter of the total), due to 
the fi nancing of the SLS by the Treasury.
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These considerations drastically reduce the expected cost of fi nancial support. However, it 
should be borne in mind that a portion of the committed amounts not entailing an immediate 
cost (mainly guarantees and central bank fi nancing) may end up generating an effective cost; 
although this fi nancing is backed by assets, the widening of eligible collateral to less secure 
assets entails a greater risk. Nor is it possible, in this case, to make estimates in this respect. 
Even the indicators which might serve as a guide – credit default swaps (CDSs) of institutions 
whose liabilities are backed by guarantees, which theoretically refl ect the probability of non-
payment assigned by the markets – show high volatility in the current circumstances and their 
information value is arguable.11
In any event, the depth and persistence of the crisis and the growing range of measures being 
taken by central banks and Treasuries unquestionably expose public fi nances to additional 
costs which may turn out to be potentially very high.
The second way in which economic policy responds to the crisis is in the form of fi scal stimu-
lus packages aimed at sustaining aggregate demand. Apart from exceptions such as the 
United States or Spain, these plans were announced as from October and have been progres-
sively implemented – and extended – in the ensuing months. Also in this case the accounting 
treatment is complicated by the different items contained in some announcements (particu-
larly fi nancing, which, as noted above, is considered to form part of fi nancial support) and by 
the inter-period allocation, since some measures are annual, some are multi-year and some 
have no specifi c time horizon.
The top panel of Chart 5 sets out the amount of the packages announced by countries for 
2008 to 2010.12 The aggregate annual average of the G20+ is 1.4% of GDP and, in this case, 
the commitments are slightly higher in the emerging economies (1.4%) than in the advanced 
economies (1.25%), since in recent months the former have made an additional effort, against 
a backdrop in which market conditions have tended to stabilise. In any event, the available 
data indicate that the announced fi scal effort is more sustained in the developed economies, 
where the peak (1.6% of GDP) will be reached next year, whereas in the emerging economies 
it will be reached this year, at 2.4% of GDP, after which it will fall off.
There are, in any event, notable differences between countries. Again, the United States 
stands out in regard to the funds provided, particularly in the plan approved at the beginning 
of this year for $787 billion, 5.5% of GDP, of which some $200 billion (1.3% of GDP) will be 
utilised as from 2011. When added to the plan approved in February 2008, this amounts to 
nearly 1.7% of the average annual GDP of the three years in question, and next year will ex-
ceed 2.7% of GDP. Also notable is the recent Japanese tax stimulus, expanded by the ex-
traordinary April budget, which this year will reach 2.4% of GDP (1.5% of the average total 
stimulus in the three years). In the United Kingdom, the budget envisages a signifi cant expan-
sion this year (1.6% of GDP), but a negative stimulus next year, which will leave the annual 
average for the three years at just 0.6% of its GDP. The euro area is also among the lower 
rankings, with an average stimulus of barely half-a-percentage-point of its GDP. Within the 
euro area, Spain’s fi scal stimulus is fairly signifi cant: 1.25% of GDP on average and concen-
trated in 2009 (1.9% of GDP). Lastly, two emerging economies have the highest fi scal stimu-
li: Russia (1.8% of GDP on average for the three years), making use of its fi nancial reserves 
Fiscal stimulus plans, 
business cycle and other 
factors
11. For example, fi ve-year CDSs of the major US banks exceeded 500 basis points (bp) in October and then fl uctuated 
between 200 bp and 400 bp. These fl uctuations refl ect relatively high probabilities of default, but these numbers are not 
very reliable due to the distortion of this market and the fact that the volumes are notional. 12. Most of the fi gures are 
IMF projections and are consistent with its World Economic Outlook (2009b), but some have been updated using the 
latest-known plans. For Spain the Banco de España projections (2009) have been used.
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derived from oil, and China (2.1% of GDP), whose response capability does not depend on 
external fi nancing.
Fiscal plans are generally biased towards measures based on public expenditure, particularly 
on infrastructure. On the revenue side, the tax cut focused on direct taxes and rebates, while 
the indirect tax cuts were merely symbolic. The higher proportion of public spending measures 
(around 60% of the total) may be explained by the private sector’s lower marginal propensity 
to consume and invest, against a backdrop of economic and fi nancial fragility and of negative 
outlook, thus making tax cuts less effective. However, the lag in implementing the expenditure, 
at a time when urgent action is needed to stimulate demand, may constrain its effectiveness 
in the short term.
To assess the impact of the crisis on public fi nances, in addition to the discretionary measures 
to boost demand, account must be taken of the automatic stabilisers operating through gov-
ernment revenue and expenditure. Given the expected contraction of activity, the impact of 
 AUTOMATIC STABILISERS
 COMMODITIES
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these automatic stabilisers on fi scal balances may be notable, to the point of affecting the 
amount of the fi scal stimulus plans. In general, it is considered that the fi scal balance of conti-
nental European countries exhibits a greater elasticity with respect to the business cycle than 
that of the United Kingdom or the United States, while in the emerging countries, where the 
social protection networks are less developed and the fi scal structures are less solid, the sta-
bilisers are less powerful. However, in some developing economies that are commodity ex-
porters, the slowdown in global activity is having a strong impact on fi scal accounts through 
the fall in prices and export volumes of these products, which provide a signifi cant portion of 
fi scal revenue. Lastly, as explained in Section 2, the loss of revenue derived from the fi nancial 
adjustment (lower profi ts, dividends and asset values), which is not normally considered when 
making cyclical adjustments to fi scal balances, must be taken into account. This impact will 
depend on the taxation of these tax bases and will be more marked in those economies in 
which the fi nancial sector has a greater weight, such as the United States, Switzerland or the 
United Kingdom.
The bottom panel of Chart 5 provides estimates of the relative impact on the defi cit in 2009 of 
the non-discretionary factors related to the fall in activity.13 Automatic stabilisers are estimated 
to be responsible for approximately half of the non-discretionary increase in the defi cit in the 
G20+ as a whole, for three-quarters in the advanced economies and for barely 20%-25% in 
the emerging countries. In the latter, the main contribution derives from the loss of revenue 
associated with the adjustment of commodities (more than half the total, as compared with 
zero in the developed countries). The adjustment of fi nancial asset and real estate prices con-
tributes to a similar extent in all the groups considered, accounting for around one-quarter of 
the total.
Now that the various channels through which the crisis and the economic policy response af-
fect fi scal balances and government debt have been assessed, their overall impact on public 
fi nances may be analysed. The top panels of Chart 6 show the projected increases in the 
defi cit for 2009 and 2010 with respect to 2007, which resulted in all cases in the drastic widen-
ing of budget defi cits. Numerous countries may reach double-digit defi cits in terms of GDP, 
thereby dissipating the gradual recovery of fi scal balances which had been under way in most 
countries in the last 15 years. Some countries, such as the United States, will record defi cits 
not seen since the end of the Second World War.
Thus, with respect to the year before the crisis (2007), the projections indicate that the 
defi cit will increase by 7.6 percentage points (pp) of GDP in 2009, from 1% to 8%, and will 
fall only to 6.9% in 2010 in the G20+ as a whole. In the advanced economies the increase 
is even larger, from 2% to 10% in 2009, falling to 7.7% of GDP in 2010. In the four major 
emerging economies (BRICs), the deterioration is somewhat less, since an aggregate bal-
anced budget in 2007 gives way to a defi cit of 4.5% of GDP in 2010. By country, the defi -
cits as a proportion of GDP are higher in the United States (13.6% in 2009, down to 9.7% 
in 2010), Japan, the United Kingdom (near to 10% and 9%, respectively, in the coming 
years), India (above 10% in 2009) and Spain (8.3% in 2009 and 8.7% in 2010). In fact 
Spain, along with Russia, is the economy in the sample recording the largest increase in 
defi cit since 2007, exceeding 10 pp of GDP, having started out from an ample surplus 
(2.2% in 2007). At the opposite extreme is Brazil, where the projected defi cit is lower by 2% 
of GDP.
Fiscal balances, 
government debt and debt 
dynamics in the medium 
term
13. See IMF (2009b). It should be borne in mind that the initial calculations took into account the projections made in 
2009 Q1. The worsening of these projections since then and the possible change in behaviour of commodity and fi nan-
cial asset prices have modifi ed slightly the calculations, which should be regarded with caution.
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To approximate the weight with which each factor analysed in the above sections contributes 
to the increase in the defi cit, the left-hand panel of Chart 6 sets out a (necessarily approximate) 
breakdown of that contribution in the advanced economies for the current year (8 pp of GDP, 
as stated above), distinguishing between discretionary measures (fi scal and fi nancial support) 
and the impact derived from the fall in economic and fi nancial activity.14 First, the impact of fi -
nancial support measures on the defi cit is relatively small (1.7 pp of GDP, i.e. barely 20% of the 
total), although the estimate depends on the accounting criteria adopted, since a large part of 
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14. The breakdown is carried out by taking the defi cit and structural balance projections of the IMF World Economic 
Outlook. The difference between them gives the impact of the automatic stabilisers. The fi scal impulse is derived from the 
fi gures in Chart 7 and the fi nancial support from the country fi gures and the estimate published by the IMF in March [IMF 
(2009b)]. This estimate is the one used to derive the impact of fi nancial and real estate adjustments, which is presented 
in terms of contribution in Chart 8.
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the actual outlay affects debt rather than the defi cit. Second, the fi scal stimulus packages 
amount to 1.5 pp of GDP, contributing 18% of the increase in the defi cit. The fall in fi nancial 
activity adds at least 0.6 pp of GDP, which leaves the automatic stabilisers as the main factor 
determining the increase in the defi cit (3.3 pp, or 41% of the total). Accordingly, it is estimated 
that the direct impact of the crisis contributes half (4 pp of GDP) of the increase in the defi cit, 
while the contribution of the policy response is somewhat smaller (3 pp). One percentage point 
of the increase in the defi cit could not be assigned to any category.
Debt shows similar behaviour (Chart 6, bottom right panel) to that of the defi cit, since the net 
borrowing associated with the fi scal and fi nancial support plans is producing a substantial in-
crease in government debt issuance and in the ratios with respect to GDP in practically all the 
advanced economies. According to the uniform criterion used by the IMF, the debt of the 
United States will approach 100% of GDP in 2010, while that of Japan – where the ratio was 
already very high – will amply exceed 200% of GDP. The increases in Europe are also substan-
tial. British government debt will approach 80% of GDP and that of the euro area as a whole 
will exceed this level. Spain, with a lower initial debt ratio, will approach 60%, after falling below 
40% in 2007. In many cases these fi gures represent increases in government debt equal to or 
higher than 50% of GDP. In Japan and the United States these debt ratios represent a return 
to post-war levels, while in Europe they signify a reversal of the progress made in the last few 
decades and a fresh departure from the reference limit of 60% of GDP in nearly all countries. 
By contrast, the IMF projections for the major emerging countries are that in 2009 the debt 
ratio will stabilise at around 35% of GDP, although this projection is somewhat diffi cult to rec-
oncile with the economic and fi nancial projections.
The sharp rise in debt ratios poses questions as to the sustainability of public fi nances in many 
countries and as to how to put them on a sounder basis. Although this lies outside the scope 
of this article, a basic idea may be obtained by examining the foreseeable dynamics of public 
debt, described by the following equation, where the fi scal variables are expressed in terms of 
GDP:
Increase in debt = [Real cost of debt – GDP growth] × 
× Debt at start of period – Primary balance
This expression indicates that the debt dynamics have worsened generally, in various ways: 
fi rst, there has been a jump in initial debt, derived from the fi nancial support measures and 
from the increase in defi cits; second, the increase in budget defi cits is also refl ected in a sharp 
deterioration of primary balances (i.e. net of interest payments), as shown in Chart 7, which will 
be long-lasting. Lastly, it is to be expected that debt dynamics will exert a negative infl uence, 
after a long period in which they behaved very favourably. First, because projected GDP growth 
is negative for this year and very low for next year and there is a likelihood that growth will not 
return on a sustained basis to the rates seen before the crisis; and second, because the real 
cost of fi nancing the debt in the medium term may tend to rise as the fi nancial and economic 
situation normalises and the factors responsible for the current downward pressure on gov-
ernment debt yields cease to operate or do so less strongly.
Based on the equation set out, it is possible to derive a relatively simple indicator to assess to 
what extent the debt dynamics have worsened. This indicator, shown in Chart 7, compares 
the primary balance that would be needed to stabilise the debt ratio at a certain sustainable 
level (see the footnote to Chart 7), in the long term, with the expected primary balance. Both 
the debt-stabilising balance and the primary defi cit projections have increased markedly in all 
countries, meaning that the gap that has opened between the two variables is very wide (more 
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than 5 pp of GDP in the United States and the United Kingdom, and 13 pp in Japan).15 The 
size of the gap in the euro area economies is also notable, albeit smaller (around 3 pp), while 
in Spain it scarcely exceeds 2 pp, although this is because it starts out from a ratio below 60%. 
By way of comparison with the previous situation, the chart also shows the primary balance 
projected for 2012 before the crisis (October 2007), which was close to zero in all the coun-
tries.16
In sum, government debt has entered into a negative dynamic and the debt ratio will tend to 
move on a rising trend in the coming years which, given the inertia inherent to this dynamic and 
the expectations about its determinants, will be diffi cult to reverse. 
The economic and financial crisis is requiring a strong economic policy response which, 
combined with the very gravity of the situation, has placed public finances in a delicate 
situation, especially in some developed economies. The improvement in fiscal positions 
attained in recent decades, by virtue of perseverance and fiscal discipline, has allowed 
for greater leeway in the current conjuncture. But this progress has been eroded in just 
a few short months: fiscal deficits have risen rapidly and government debt is projected 
to reach ratios relative to GDP unprecedented in recent decades. This deterioration, 
moreover, will be persistent, since debt has entered into an unfavourable dynamic that 
will be difficult to reverse. The increases in debt and in primary deficits will foreseeably 
combine with less favourable developments than in the past in long-term interest rates 
and in the pace of growth, even after this acute phase of economic recession and finan-
cial crisis.
Outlook and conclusions
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a. The outcome of the exercise depends on the initial debt ratio. If the ratio falls below 60% (as in 
Spain and, among the BRICs, in China and Russia), it would be the balance that stabilises debt in 
2027. If the ratio is above 60% (as in the US, the UK and the three main European economies), the 
estimates refer to the balance required to return the debt level to that ratio. In the case of Japan, it 
would be the balance required to halve the current debt level.
b. IMF, October 2008.
c. IMF, March 2009.
d. The euro area aggregate comprises Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
15. The exercise (see IMF (2009b)) also imposes that the difference between the cost of fi nancing and GDP growth (the 
term in brackets in the debt dynamics equation) is equal to 1 for the long-term projection period. 16. This comparison 
is partial, since the other component of the gap would also have to be considered, i.e. the primary balance that was 
stabilising the debt in October 2007 and that has also grown since, owing to the increase in debt and to the deterioration 
in its determinants.
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Other risks may be added to this negative outlook, such as the potential actual outlay of the 
funds committed which have not yet been used (and which, therefore, do not appear in the 
defi cit or debt fi gures) and the possibility that more fi scal or fi nancial support will be needed to 
overcome the crisis, putting further pressure on public fi nances. Conversely, it is also possible 
that a relatively rapid reversal of the economic and fi nancial situation may allow some of the 
amounts invested or committed to be recovered, partly alleviating the public fi nances position. 
In addition to these risks, there are structural factors that were already weighing on public fi -
nances in the long run, such as population ageing in many developed countries, which may 
further complicate the future management of countries’ fi scal and fi nancial policies.
All these considerations frame what is a diffi cult outlook for public fi nances in most developed 
countries in the coming years. This will feed through to the emerging countries, not only be-
cause of the direct effect of the crisis on their fi scal balances, but also because greater com-
petition among sovereign issuers may make it more diffi cult and more costly for them to ac-
cess fi nancing for their debt.
Turning to the private sector, the persistent increase in public sector net borrowing poses two 
signifi cant risks which, in the current conjuncture, are only latent. The fi rst is the crowding-out 
effect, through upward pressure on long-term interest rates and fi nancial costs. This effect 
might be partly mitigated in the short and medium term by the expected increase in global 
private saving, as agents rebuild their fi nancial positions. The second is that agents may an-
ticipate the need for higher taxes in the future to redress the fi scal situation, and may adapt 
their current behaviour accordingly, reducing the marginal propensity to consume. This reac-
tion would offset the effects of the fi scal stimuli, adversely affecting the outlook for recovery of 
private demand. 
All these considerations point to major challenges for the economic authorities in the coming 
years and to some economic policy conclusions. The fi rst is that, given the delicate current 
position, the fi scal room for manoeuvre is very limited and, should further stimuli or support 
prove necessary, these should be designed with the utmost care, to optimise their effi ciency 
and minimise their cost and duration. Second, the prospect of public fi nances deteriorating 
should be countered as far as possible by a credible commitment to fi scal discipline in the 
medium term. This should be made effective through countercyclical policies, once the situa-
tion of economic emergency has passed, and suffi ciently ambitious structural policies. How-
ever, this commitment should be reconciled with the sustaining of private demand in the short 
term and the restructuring of the fi nancial sector. In particular, the premature withdrawal of the 
fi scal stimulus or insuffi cient bank restructuring measures might lead to a false exit from the 
crisis, as has occurred in some cases (in Japan in particular). 
22.5.2009.
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